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Thomas Panayotopoulos  
The Energy Union – a solution for the 
European energy security? 
 
 
The conflicts of the twentieth century and especially the Second World 
War have shown that the possession of energy is of strategic importance. 
However, even in the years that followed the last major oil shock in 1986, 
the energy questions were carelessly ignored driven by the idea that the 
European Union was in a state of energy abundance. 
This is also true for the topic of energy security, which was for a long time 
left aside in the European Union. Nevertheless, this topic seems to 
resurface under the current circumstances. The new crisis which erupted 
between the EU and Russia is used in order to correct the European Union 
energy paradox, stating that the European Union, which was created around 
Energy (ECSC and EURATOM), sixty years later does not have a common 
energy security policy. In this context dependency to gas imports coming 
from Russia is perceived as a real threat for the energy security of the 
European Union revealing that the lack of diversity of energy sources as 
well as the variety of national policies in the area of energy security are the 
main reasons for this vulnerability. Furthermore, this crisis also manifests 
that in the past the priority in the European Union’s energy policies was set 
in the fight of climate change and that the question of energy security was 
left aside. However times are changing and the new European Commission 
announced a Frame-work Strategy for the Energy Union with the aim to 
overcome these exact weaknesses. 
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I.  EU’s weakness: energy dependency 
Before talking about energy dependency it is important to further define 
these terms. In order to determine what energy dependency is, the question, 
of what shares of energy imports and internal energy production are used 
for the internal energy consumption needs to be answered. The answer to 
this question gives an idea of the dependency or independency of this 
consumption vis-à-vis the external energy supply. In the case of the 
European Union the answer is strongly leaning towards dependency. 
Indeed, it is important to realise that the European Union is not in a state of 
autarchy in what concerns the sources of energy. Whatever shifts and 
changes in energy sources the European Union chooses to seek in future, 
most of this energy will be increasingly imported, aggravating thereby the 
energy dependency of the European Union. 
1.  An increasing import based energy consumption 
The energy situation of the European Union is defined by a growing 
dependency based on imports of fossil energy sources in order to satisfy the 
needs in primary energy. 
According to EUROSTAT the EU-28 dependency on energy imports 
increased from 43% of gross energy consumption in 1990 to reach 53.4% 
by 2012. The highest energy dependency rates in 2012 were recorded for 
crude oil (88.2%) and for natural gas (65.8%). Since 2004, the EU-28’s net 
imports of energy have surpassed its primary production, which means that 
more than half of the EU-28’s gross inland energy consumption was 
supplied by net imports.1 This dependency situation of the European Union 
can be explained because of structural reasons. Indeed, the European 
Union’s energy consumption is very high. Its energy consumption, which 
represents 13,5% of the total energy consumption in the world, may have 
 
 Internet resources, last date of access: 7 June 2015. 
 
1  Eurostat, Energy production and imports, Table 4. Online at: www.ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports. 
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decreased in the recent years but the European Union still belongs to the 
four most energy consuming regions in the world2.  
Beside the increasing consumption it is also the reducing energy production 
which causes a problem in the European Union. This is due to the fact that 
the European Union’s internal resources in fossil energy are highly limited. 
The European Union holds only 2% of the world's gas reserves, 2% of the 
world’s uranium reserves and only 0,65% of the world's oil reserves.3 On 
the other hand the renewable energy’s contributions to the total 
consumption of the European Union only reach 15%4. If these sources of 
energy were to stay constant the European Union’s energy dependency 
would arrive over 80% in 2035 because of the increase in energy 
consumption and the decrease in the internal energy production5. On the 
long term only a significant technological leap would provide the 
possibility to reduce the dependency in imported fossil energies6. This 
tendency towards a growing energy dependency is true for the four major 
fossil energy sources. The dependency for crude oil which lies at 88% will 
reach 95% in 2030. The same tendency is visible for natural gas hence the 
current level of dependency of 65% will grow to 84% in 2030. Last but not 
least the solid fuels import level will raise from 42,2% to 67% in 2030.7 
 
2  Ratcliffe, Pierre, L’énergie en Europe, 2012: 2f. Online at: www.pratclif.com/ 
economy/oil&gas/energy-europ.pdf; Eurostat, communiqué de presse, La 
consommation d’énergie en baisse de 8% entre 2006 et 2012 dans l’UE28, 
17.2.2014: 1; European Commission, EU Energy in Figures – Statistical 
Pocketbook, Luxembourg, 2013: 13. Online at: www.ec.europa.eu/energy/ 
sites/ener/files/documents/2013_pocketbook.pdf. 
3 Indexmundi, Oil reserves. Online at: www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=ee&v=97. 
4  Eurostat, Gross inland Energy from renewable sources. Online at: 
www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Energy_from_renewable_
sources. 
5  Casey, Zoë, Rising energy dependency endangers Europe’s economy, 23.3.2013. 
Online at: www.ewea.org/blog/2013/05/rising-energy-dependency-endangers-
europes-economy/. 
6  European Economic and Social Committee, Energy efficiency – changing 
behaviour and ways to achieve results. Online at: www.eesc.europa.eu 
/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-energy-efficiency-changing-behaviour . 
7  European Commission, EU energy trends to 2030, Luxembourg, 2010. 
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While the European Union is making good progress towards meeting its 
climate and energy targets for 2020, a policy framework for the period up 
to 2030 will be established to ensure a coordinated approach among the 
member states. The European Union policies concerning the fight against 
climate change incorporate both action in the areas of climate and energy. 
Next to the protection of the climate these policies have beneficial long 
term effects for the energy security of the European Union, even though 
these are only the indirect consequences of the environmental goals. In this 
context the European Union set some goals that needed to be reached by 
2020.8  
First, the reduction of the European Union’s energy consumption by 20% 
till 2020 through the improvement of the energy efficiency will have the 
automatic consequence of mitigating the imported energy dependency. The 
European Union is also engaged in diminishing the greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 20% by 2020. The implementation of quotas will 
incite to restrain from energy consumption produced by fossil fuels. 
Finally, the ambition to raise the share of the used renewable energy to 
20% in the European Union, will most certainly have the effect of lowering 
the employment of fossil fuels in the energy mix.9 In January 2014, the 
European Commission presented the 2030 framework that seeks to 
continue the progress set by the 2020 framework. When reached, the goals 
set by these two agendas will certainly be beneficial for the energy security. 
If the dependency itself won't be stopped, this policy implementing demand 
restraint and promoting renewable energy will at least contribute to lower 
the growth of this energy dependency10. This should however not be the 
 
8  Information given by the European Commission on its website, The 2020 climate 
and energy package. Online at: www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/ 
index_en.htm. 
9  Ibid; see as well European Commission, GREEN PAPER – A European Strategy 
for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, Brussels, 2006: 10, 19. 
10  European Commission, European Energy and Transport – Scenarios on energy 
efficiency and renewable, Luxembourg, 2006: 13; de Vos, Rolf/van Breevoort, 
Pieter/Höhne, Niklas/Winkel, Thomas/Sachweh, Catherine, Assessing the EU 2030 
Climate and Energy targets, ECOFYS Briefing Paper, 2014: 16. Online at: 
www.ecofys.com/files/files/ecofys-2014-assessing-the-eu-2030-targets.pdf. 
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reason to believe that such policies are a substitute to the needed common 
policy for energy security. 
Even though some see the solution to the increasing dependency in the 
atomic energy11, this does not correspond to full reality. On one hand an 
increase of atomic energy being also linked to imports, since the uranium 
resources are almost entirely imported, would automatically raise this 
dependency. On the other hand such a measure would diversify the nature 
of this dependency and would therefore increase the energy security. 
However, coordinated increase is not feasible in the European Union. After 
the accidents in the nuclear facilities in Japan, many European Union 
members are reluctant to increase to use or even to have atomic energy12. 
Germany decided to speed up the shuttering of nine remaining reactors by 
about a decade, to 202213. This division amongst the European member 
states clearly excludes the possibility of a coordinated revival as an internal 
antidote to the energy dependency14. Although the coal resources of the 
European Union are abundant, the shares of coal in the European energy 
mix will still decrease. Indeed, coal is the source of energy which emits the 
highest quantities of CO². The production of effective technologies filtering 
the CO² being only elementary, the use of coal as a source of energy seems 
nearly incompatible with the environmental goals the European Union set 
itself. A possible evolution of the sources of energy in the European Union 
does not appear to be able to change the trend towards an expanding 
dependency on imported primary energy. 
  
 
11  European Nuclear Society, Nuclear in the energy mix, 18.5.2011. Online at: 
www.euronuclear.org/1-information/energy-mixes.htm. 
12  Phillips, Leigh, “Europe divided over nuclear power after Fukushima disaster”, The 
Guardian, 25.5.2011. 
13 Knopf, Brigitte/Kondziella, Hendrik/Pahle, Michael/Götz, Mario/Bruckner, 
Thomas/Edenhofer, Ottmar, Der Einstieg in den Ausstieg: Energiepolitische 
Szenarien für einen Atomausstieg in Deutschland, WISO Diskurs, Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Bonn, 10.06.2011. Online at: www.fes.de/aktuell/ documents 
2011/110610_Studie_Atomausstieg.pdf; Deutscher Bundestag, Bundestag be-
schließt Atomausstieg und Energiewende. Online at: www.bundestag.de/ 
dokumente/textarchiv/2011/34938007_kw26_de_energiewende/205804. 
14  Phillips, op. cit. 
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2.  A constant dependency regardless of the energy nature 
All currently used imported fossil energy sources contribute to the energy 
dependency in the European Union. Despite this fact, the different ways 
they are imported and used gives an idea that every single of these fossil 
energy sources has a different impact on the energy security of the 
European Union. 
The crude oil represents around 37% of the primary energy mix in the 
European Union15. Although this energy source plays only a marginal role 
in the production of electricity and heat, in the field of transports it still 
satisfies almost the total of what is needed16. This situation might remain 
stable around 35%, if there is no major technological progress. 
Nevertheless at the moment the existence of a well-integrated world market 
seems to appease the dangers of a supply interruption of the European 
Union. Even though the European Union mainly imports crude oil from 
Norway and Russia17, the European Union is not geographically bound to 
these supplies. The predominance of seaborne crude oil transports permits 
to the crude oil market to be perfectly interconnected worldwide.18 This 
interconnection may also be the reason why the price per barrel of crude oil 
is fixed on the international market. The increasing integration of the crude 
oil market is therefore the main warrant against a supply disruption for 
many regions of the world as for the European Union. 
In the European Union, natural gas speaks for around 25% of the energy 
mix19. It is used for the three main purposes of industrial needs, production 
of electricity and heating. Following the tendency of certain European 
 
15  European Commission, Market Observatory for Energy, key figures, June 2011: 11. 
Online at:  www.feb.kuleuven.be/public/n07048/EU%20Energy.pdf; European 
Commission, Member States’ Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based 
Assessment, Occasional Paper 196, Brussels, 2013: 13. 
16  Ibid. 
17  See information on EU crude oil imports given by the European Commission. 
Online at: www.ec.europa.eu/energy/en/statistics/eu-crude-oil-imports. 
18  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review on 
Maritime Transport 2013, New York, 2013: 14f. Online at: www.unctad.org/ 
en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=753. 
19  European Commission, op. cit., p. 11. 
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Union member states withdrawing from nuclear energy, the share of gas 
will increase in the energy mix of the European Union. By 2030 natural gas 
will represent 31% of the European Union's energy mix.20 This trend to 
natural gas fits better to the environmental goals set by the European 
Union, hence it is less polluting than crude oil or coal.   
In parallel the internal gas production in the European Union itself will 
decrease by 40%, meaning that the imports in natural gas will 
automatically grow. Despite the fact that the European Union is less 
dependent in percentage to gas compared with crude oil, the structure of the 
gas market provokes a far greater impact. Indeed, contrary to the crude oil 
market the gas market is less diversified and more tied to a land transport 
network. In fact 82% of gas transport is done through pipelines. 
Nevertheless the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) (18%) provides 
with a possibility to avoid this structural particularity. The European Union 
LNG regasification capacity has more than doubled in the past five years. 
In 2012, 19 regasification terminals were operating. Liquefying natural gas 
permits its seaborne transport, which could in long term reduce physical 
dependency between consuming and producing regions.21 Notwithstanding 
this form of transportation has the particularity to need regasification 
terminals and cannot as opposed to petrol use every industrial port. 
In this context it becomes clear that the security of supply is not equal for 
gas and petrol. The gas market of the European Union is limited to certain 
producers who are tied to the European Union through the existing pipeline 
network, as the insufficient maritime connections for LNG are not a serious 
alternative. The risk of a physical supply disruption is therefore far higher 
to set for natural gas. 
According to the 2013 monthly data the European Union imported 223 Mt 
of hard coal, compared with 204 Mt in 2012. Russia and Colombia 
remained the two leading sources, with shares of 29.7% and 22.6% 
respectively. Europe disposes 10% of the world's coal reserves which could 
 
20  ENA, Direction des Etudes, Securite energetique exterieure de l’Union 
Européenne: quelle strategie Française? Paris, 2009. Online at: 
www.ena.fr/index.php?/fr/content/download/. 
21  Eurogas, Statistical Report 2013, Brussels, 2013: 7. 
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be translated into 200 years of consumption. 22  However, the price of 
production is too high. The European coal is therefore three to four times 
more expensive than the imported one. This means that its dependency to 
imports results from an economical choice. Furthermore, because the costs 
of transport are not very high, the possibility to diversify the imports is 
made easy as coal is the most spread energy source in the world. 
The supply with natural uranium is also largely unproblematic as it does 
not represent any hindrance for the European Union. It is easy to transport 
and its stockpile can be found around the world. More than 11 countries are 
in possession of over 93% of the world's reserves. Moreover, the imports 
within the European Union are diversified. The highest imports come from 
Canada and are therefore considered to be very stable in long term. The 
second highest amount comes from Russia. In order to keep a steady supply 
EURATOM has engaged in bilateral agreements for the peaceful use of 
atomic energy with some of the key suppliers.23 Furthermore it is important 
to state that the price of uranium has a very limited effect on the price of 
atomic energy. Indeed, uranium represents only a small part of the atomic 
energy costs. Therefore the dependency on uranium cannot be considered 
of great importance. 
Except for natural gas, it reasonable to say that all other fossil energy 
imports give rise to a strictly economical dependency which is based on the 
international prices. In the case of natural gas this is however different as 
this energy source does not enjoy the existence of a worldwide integrated 
market. For the natural gas the European Union is bound to a physical 
dependency on the imports. 
  
 
22  Eurostat, Coal consumption statistics. Online at: www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
statistics-explained/index.php/Coal_consumption_statistics,; see as well European 
Commission, The Market for Solid Fuels in the Community in 2008 and Estimates 
for 2009, Brussels, 2010. Online at: www.ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/ 
documents/2011_eu_market_solid_fuels_2010.pdf. 
23  Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the 
European Atomic Energy Community and the Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan. 
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II.  EU’s energy dependency: cause of multiple risks 
The European Union energy dependency comes with three different threats 
for the energy security. First of all the European Union must cope with a 
sudden supply disruption provoked by natural, technical, or terrorist 
reasons. Secondly, if for a certain energy source the European Union 
disposes of only a limited amount of supply or transit countries, this is to be 
considered a threat for the energy security. Finally, the European Union's 
behaviour itself could be a danger if the European Union fails to invest in 
new forms of energy production. 
1.  The risk of an imminent supply disruption 
Secure energy supplies play a crucial role in the world economy and are 
essential to fuel the development of contemporary society. The risks of 
supply disruption are diverse and have each of them a different impact on 
supply security. 
Technical accidents and natural catastrophes belong to the situations 
possible to create a supply interruption. In the occurrence of technical 
problems and natural phenomena it is mainly the infrastructure that can be 
damaged. This could lead to supply reductions and would have thereby a 
repercussion on the European Union. Indeed, when the hurricane Katrina 
took place in the United States of America (USA) in August 2005, the oil 
production in the Gulf of Mexico was reduced by 79%24. The reduction in 
this region covering one third of the oil reserves in the world, caused the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) member countries to use strategic 
reserves25. In the short term the storage of imported energy as for example 
oil and gas storages, constitute an important shock-absorbing mechanism to 
overcome supply interruptions. These storages also enable to intervene on 
the market in order to calm down possible excessive speculations after a 
one-off shock. The IEA and the European Union set therefore the 
 
24  Dancy Joseph, Energy markets set to ignite, Financial Sense University, 2.10.2005. 
Online at: www.financialsensearchive.com/fsu/editorials/dancy/2005/1002.html. 
25  Office of Fossil Energy, Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Online at: www.energy.gov/ 
fe/services/petroleum-reserves/strategic-petroleum. 
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obligation to its members to store energy at least for 90 consumption 
days26.  
Theses extreme situations can create damages for the transportation 
infrastructure. It is important to mention that a major part of the existing 
infrastructure is aging (pipelines), and would therefore need modernisation, 
even though such damages can be repaired quickly in most of the cases.27 
Nevertheless weather-related hazards are likely to increase under the 
influence of climate change. This could be translated into a multiplication 
of incidents of supply disruption-The series of price increases following 
accidents and natural catastrophes would however not last long. As it was 
seen several times when such situations occurred, after a couple of weeks 
the prices decreased taking their pre-incident form28. The market soon 
realises that the technical accident or weather related hazard was only a 
punctual event. 
Another risk for supply disruption are terrorist attacks which make the 
biggest headlines in the media. With this regularly used term different 
forms of intentional actions against energy infrastructures are meant that 
can interfere with the energy supply.  
Terrorist or criminal acts are not a hypothetical situation only possible to 
happen. They represent a real threat to the European Union as for the rest 
 
26  European Council Directive 2009/119/EC, 14.9.2009; International Energy 
Agency, IEA Methodology for Calculating Minimum Stockholding Obligation and 
Compliance. Online at: www.iea.org/topics/oil/oilstocks/methodology/#d.en.26791; 
Clingendael International Energy Programme, Fact Sheet, Russia – Europe: the 
liquid relationship often overlooked. Online at: www.clingendaelenergy.com/ 
files.cfm?event: 3. 
27  “Gas blast causes fire in Moscow”, BBC News, 10.5.2009; “300 Meter hohe 
Flammen über Moskau: Pipeline-Explosion verursacht Großbrand”, News AT, 
10.05.2009. Online at: www.news.at/a/300-meter-flammen-moskau-pipeline-
explosion-grossbrand-241599; see as well “Gas Pipeline Explosion at 
Ghislenghien”, Hazards Intelligence, Dossier, Belgium, 14.2.2005. Online at: 
www.iab-atex.nl/publicaties/database/Ghislenghien%20Dossier.pdf. 
28  Shabecoff, Philip, “Six groups urge boycott of Exxon”, The New York Times, 
3.5.1989.  
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of the world29. This is shown by the numbers themselves. Between 2010 
and 2011 there was a sharp increase of attacks directed at energy 
infrastructure around the world, including fuel tankers, fuel pipelines and 
electrical networks, rising from 299 to 438 attacks 30 . The growing 
terrorists’ interest for such targets is due to the fact that energy 
infrastructures are interdependent and belong to a long supply chain. 
Striking at one of the links of the supply chain, clearly affects the fossil fuel 
dependent western economies. 
Mainly such actions are led by political or religious claims. In Nigeria, 
which is for example the eighth largest fossil fuel producer in the world, 
the rebels of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) achieved through sabotage and attacks against the infrastructure to 
reduce the oil production by 25%31. Because of this Nigeria loses 300.000 
barrels of oil per day32. Although Nigeria may seem far away from the 
European Union, the oil production loss there has an effect on the whole 
world causing higher prices. However, it does not represent an isolated 
incident of that kind. The Arish-Ashkelon pipeline for example, linking 
Egypt and Israel, was attacked 13 times in the year following the fall of 
Mubarak, with dramatic consequences for Israel’s energy security. And 
even recently in January 2013, Islamist terrorists attacked BP’s oil 
production in the Algerian desert and kidnapped employees of that 
company.33 The physical attempts to strike against energy facilities are 
above all first translated in the energy prices. Indeed, the price of crude oil 
 
29  Jopling, Lord Michael, Energy Security: Co-operating to Enhance the Protection of 
Critical Energy Infrastructures, Introduction, 2012. Online at: www.nato-
pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1478. 
30  U.S. Department of State, National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical 
Information, 31.7.2012. Online at: www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195555.htm. 
31  Bala-Gbogbo, Elisha, Nigeria’s MEND Rebels Threaten Future Attack on Oil 
Industry, Bloomberg, 27.1.2014; Courson, Elias, Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger delta (MEND), Discussion Paper 47, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 
Uppsala, 2009: 18ff. 
32  Shell Companies in Nigeria, Oil theft, sabotage and spills, 2014: 1f. Online at: 
www.s05.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/nga/downloads/pdf/ 
2014bnotes/spills.pdf. 
33  Maher, Shiraz, EUCERS Energy Talks, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 
London/Berlin, 2013: 7f. 
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for example incorporates a share for terrorism risks34. Besides increasing 
the prices of fossil fuels, the infrastructures' critical exposure to criminal 
and terrorist actions also escalates the risk of a supply disruption. In cases 
of an attack on critical infrastructures a total supply disruption is indeed 
also possible. The exposure of energy facilities forms a weak point of the 
energy supply chain to the European Union. Outside the European Union's 
territory several facilities are of utmost importance for the European 
Union’s energy security. The Qatargas LNG terminal in Ras Laffan or the 
Druzhba (Brotherhood) pipeline constitutes strategic infrastructures 
delivering energy to the European Union. On the European Union’s 
territory the main points of entry for oil and gas terminals are equally of 
key importance. An attempt to strike against these facilities would mean a 
serious supply interruption affecting immediately the European Union. 
Next to the politically led actions, economical interest also plays a role. 
Indeed, in the last years the world witnessed the reappearance of piracy, a 
phenomenon that was long thought to belong to ancient times. These piracy 
actions are mostly driven by the goal to achieve a financial profit by 
criminal means. For the transportation of energy these piracy attacks 
represent a growing risk and such actions have the same disruption effect 
as terrorism. As the International Maritime Bureau states in its annual 
global piracy report, 264 attacks were recorded worldwide in 2013, 
compared with 297 in 2012 and 439 in 201135. It was the lowest figure 
since 270 attacks were recorded in 2007. This is linked to the fact that 
Somali piracy diminished because of the greater deterrence by international 
naval vessels deployed in this region. Piracy of West Africa, however, has 
been increasing in recent years, which shows no sign of easing, account for 
31 of that region’s 51 reported attacks, many of them targeting vessels 
 
34  Karolyi, G. Andrew, The Consequences of Terrorism for Financial Markets: What 
Do We Know? Cornell University, Ithaca, 7.5.2006. Online at: 
www.fisher.osu.edu/supplements/10/9860/ 200606.pdf.  
35  ICC Commercial Crime Services, Somali pirate clampdown caused drop in global 
piracy, IMB reveals, 15.1.2014. Online at: www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2014/ 
Somali-pirate-clampdown-caused-drop-in-global-piracy,-IMB-report-reveals/; 
Gladstone, Rick, “Global Piracy Hits Lowest Level Since 2007”, Report Says, The 
New York Times, 15.1.2014. 
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serving Nigeria’s oil industry. The consequences of the piracy on energy 
vessels in this region are crucial for the European Union as it imports 
nearly 10% of its oil and 4% of its natural gas from the Gulf of Guinea. 
Countries like Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are 
significant suppliers of crude oil, Nigeria of natural gas.36 A single attack 
on an energy vessel alone is not deemed to have a long term effect on the 
European Union’s supply security. Nevertheless, this would not be the case 
if the attacks were multiplied. In that case the attacks could provoke an 
extended outage of maritime traffic in the concerned regions. 
Faced with these threats efforts have been made in the protection of the 
energy facilities. The Atalanta operation against piracy – established in the 
context of the European security and defence policy – showed that 
coordinated actions bring the best results. As the European Union’s 
dependence on imported fossil fuels increases, it may become increasingly 
attractive to launch CSDP military missions in response to energy supply 
security problems, both to protect supply and to develop the military 
dimension of CSDP in a low-risk, low-cost context. Crude oil is an 
internationally-traded and strategic commodity crucial to the functioning of 
all European Union economies, and security threats to oil supply could 
prove a particularly galvanising force for unanimity between European 
Union member states in decisions around CSDP missions. The European 
Union’s dependence on oil and gas imports from unstable regions like West 
Africa and the Middle East is growing. The European Union is considering 
investing in the proposed Trans-Sahara gas pipeline (TSGP) which would 
source gas from the troubled Niger Delta. The dire humanitarian and 
conflict situation in that region implies that the European Union will need 
to consider a security response to protect the pipeline if it is built. Unless 
the European Union takes steps to reduce oil and gas demand across the 
member states, the pressure to respond militarily to protect seaborne oil 
 
36  Council of the European Union, EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea, 17.3.2014; 2. 
Online at: www.eeas.europa.eu/gulf_guinea/docs/strategy_en.pdf; Chapsos, 
Ioannis, “Stopping West African piracy is vital for Europe’s energy security”, The 
Conversation, 27.3.2014. 
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shipments and to invest in risky, morally-compromised fossil fuel projects 
will remain.37 
The permanently existing risks of supply disruption for the European 
Union because of technical problems, weather related hazards, criminal or 
terrorist actions, pushes the European Union to improve its crisis 
management mechanisms and to secure critical energy facilities in and 
outside the European Union. 
2.  The dependency towards a limited amount of supply countries 
The import dependency itself is not a problem, hence most of the regions in 
the world depend on energy imports. Indeed, the European Union is not 
aiming to be an energy autarkic region. The problematic side of the 
European Union’s position is far more the geographic concentration of 
some energy resources to a limited amount of supply countries. This 
explains the frequently heard position that the European Union should 
increase its diversity of supply widening thereby the bottleneck it has to get 
through38. Contrary to coal and uranium, which are easy to supply with and 
well dispersed around the world, the gas and oil resources are more and 
more localised in a small number of countries. 
The threat of an embargo or a radical increase of prices was for a long time 
perceived as one of the major dangers of oil concentration. The reason 
behind it is historical. Indeed, in the oil shock in the mid-1970s such 
influent instruments where often used in order to impose a political 
statement39. Today the globalised market does not allow to a producing 
country to deprive an importing country of its resources. Furthermore the 
 
37  The Quaker Council for European Affairs, Military Responses to Energy Security 
Problems, November 2010: 3. Online at: www.qcea.org/wp-content/uploads /2011 
/04/rprt-milresponses-en-nov-2010.pdf . 
38  Duhme Kerstin, “What’s the future for Europe’s energy supply?” E! Sharp, May 
2005. Online at: wwwesharp.eu/big-debates/energy-and-the-environment/39-what-
future-for-europe-s-energy-supply/; Milner, Mark, “Eon boss says diversity of 
energy supplies crucial for future needs”, The Guardian, 7.2.2008; Chilchester, 
Giles, Security of supply is best maintained by diversity, New Europe, 12.12.2011. 
Online at: www.neurope.eu/blog/security-supply-best-maintained-diversity/. 
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31.10.2013. Online at: www.history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo. 
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European Union is now far less dependent on the oil provided by the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 40 . This is 
mainly due to the supply diversification and energy efficiency effort the 
European Union put forward since the 1970's. The OPEC does not 
represent a threat for the European Union at the moment. Indeed, the OPEC 
faces internal disputes which are preventing it from steering the oil market. 
The OPEC is divided between two groups of countries.  
On the one hand, the countries which are sparsely populated but rich in 
resources (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) wish to maintain 
the moderate prices for a long term preservation of the current situation. On 
the other hand, the countries with a diametrically opposed demography are 
trying to increase benefits in order to cope with running budget expenses 
(Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela). These inner disparities keep the risk for the 
European Union very small, as to see a common action of the OPEC 
threatening the European Union's oil supply. 
The concentration of the natural gas production seems for many to be the 
epicentre of the European Union's political and economic vulnerability. 
Indeed, the discussions currently held in the European Union directly point 
on the imports of gas from Russia coming through Ukraine. Although 
several disputes between Russia and Ukraine existed earlier, the 
dependency of the European Union to imported gas from Russia was only 
seen as a serious weakness since the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes of 
2009. Because Ukraine failed to pay its debts, Russia decided to halt the 
gas supplying to the European Union through the Druzhba (Brotherhood) 
pipeline. This crisis actually signified the beginning of the European 
Union's involvement in this dispute. If in 2009 some voices were 
denouncing this dependency situation, today in the light of the current 
dramatic developments in Ukraine, these voices have doubled. It seems 
however very odd from a historical perspective that these imports of gas 
from Russia are today a synonym for an energy security threat. Indeed, the 
 
40  Aleklett, Kjell, European Energy Horizons 2014, Aleklett’s Energy Mix, 7.5.2014. 
Online at: www.aleklett.wordpress.com/2014/05/07/european-energy-horizons-
2014/. 
Thomas Panayotopoulos 
16 
 
supply of gas from Russia was more than thirty years mainly 
unproblematic, even if at the time the cold war was in place.  
Today Russia is the biggest gas supplier of the European Union providing 
30% of the European Union's gas consumption demand, followed by 
Norway representing only 18% of gas supply.41 It is therefore right to say 
that the dependence of the European Union to Russian gas in unusually 
high.42 Unlike the oil imports, the gas situation clearly shows a lack of 
diversity. Nevertheless while it is true that the European Union is highly 
dependent on Russian gas imports, one should keep in mind that the 
European Union-Russia relationship is an interdependent one. Russia as 
well is increasingly dependent of the European Union43. Conversely the 
European Union is importing about 76% of Russia's natural gas, being 
thereby the highest export destination of Russian gas 44 . This mutual 
dependency cannot be qualified to be of short term, hence the supply 
contracts between Gazprom and the European counterparts are long term 
contracts.  
The European Union's dependency to Russia is clear, especially 
considering the aspect that Russia holds the highest amount of gas in the 
world together with the fact that the European gas consumption is predicted 
to increase in the future. Through this lens, avoiding gas imports from 
Russia will be impossible also in the future for the European Union. On the 
other side the question is if this dependence will further exist for the 
Russian side in the future. The answer used to be simple, as there was no 
alternative for Russia to export high amounts of gas somewhere else. 
However, recent events turn the situation upside down, as after more than a 
decade of negotiations, China and Russia have agreed to a natural gas deal 
 
41  Clingendael International Energy Programme, Russian gas imports to Europe, 
 Fact Sheet, 2014: 1, 3. Online at: www.clingendaelenergy.com/files.cfm?event. 
42  Tindale, Stephen, How to reduce dependence on Russian gas, Centre for European 
Reform, London, 10.4.2014. Online at: www.cer.org.uk/insights/how-reduce-
dependence-russian-gas. 
43  Lough, John, The EU’s Tough Gas Game With Russia, London, Chatham House, 
12.6.2014. 
44  Russia’s trade ties with Europe, BBC News, 4.3.2014. Online at: www.bbc.com/ 
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worth about $400 billion  which represents a major step not only in global 
energy markets but also in geopolitics45. This deal goes with Russia’s aim 
to increase exports to Asia, as stated in its Energy Strategy to 203046. By 
2030, the strategy envisions that the Asian exports of oil will constitute 
22%-25% (as opposed to the current 6%), and gas 19-20% (as opposed to 
the current 0%)47. This gas will be mainly delivered through a new pipeline 
that Gazprom is constructing from the Siberian gas fields of near Irkutsk 
and Yakutsk to the Chinese border. Several other pipelines are also 
planned to be built.48 This deal will give Russia the possibility to diversify 
its export destinations. Even though many European experts tend to play 
down this new turn in the gas market by stating that no pipeline linking 
Russia and China exists to this moment, the European Union should be 
careful not to underestimate the possibility of Russia slowly but firmly 
reorienting its economy to the East49. One should not forget that Russia is 
the third largest trading partner of the European Union, as the European 
Union exports machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, medicine 
and agricultural products to Russia50.  
All these elements plead for an imminent need to diversify the sources and 
ways of gas supply in the European Union. For this the European Union 
should concentrate its investment in new ways and regions of gas supply.  
 
 
45  Mazneva, Elena/Kravchenko Stepan, “Russia, China Sign $400 Billion Gas Deal 
After Decade of Talks”, Bloomberg, 21.5.2014. Online at: www.bloomberg.com/ 
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47  Tharoor, Ishaan, “MAP: What the epic China-Russia natural gas deal looks like”, 
The Washington Post, 21.5.2014; Anishchuk, Alexei, “As Putin looks east, China 
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3.  EU’s energy infrastructure: A lack of necessary investment 
Transmission interconnections between the various national systems are 
crucial facilities to assure security of supply. They enable a member state 
with a shortage in energy to import energy from another member state 
which has a surplus of it. In recent decades however, cross-border 
interconnections have taken on a wider role because of the aims the 
European Union has set. The steps taken through the different Energy 
Packages, to promote investment in new cross-border interconnections are 
closely linked to the expansion in renewable energy sources which is 
planned under the 20/20/20 agreement. A number of these renewable 
projects require extensive increase in the interconnections between 
different national grids in order to develop their full potential. In the first 
place, interconnection capacity between member states remains generally 
insufficient and certain regions, such as the Baltic States, Spain the United 
Kingdom and Ireland remain isolated. However interconnecting pipelines 
have been built between Romania and Hungary, Hungary and Croatia, 
Slovenia and Austria, and Poland and the Czech Republic. In late March, 
the leaders of Hungary and Slovakia inaugurated their own connector.51 
This trend has to be continued. According to the 2030 Energy Package 
member states have to achieve interconnection capacity equivalent to at 
least 20% of peak demand by 203052. 
Next to the interconnection of renewable energy production facilities the 
problem of insufficient interconnections also plays an important role in the 
cases of LNG. Even though liquefied natural gas imports recently 
decreased, their importance will only grow because of the need for 
diversification in the European Union gas market. In order to allow such an 
increase to happen interconnection between the member states should be 
constructed.  For example in the case of Spain and France it is a pity, that 
the inexistence of a pipeline connecting the two networks does not allow 
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Europe to take advantage of Spain’s excess import capacity for LNG53. 
Other countries such as Poland and Estonia have also begun the process of 
building large LNG import terminals at their Baltic Sea ports that would 
enable LNG to be distributed throughout Northern and Eastern Europe 
contributing thereby to the diversity of supply. Huge investments are 
therefore required in networks and interconnectors, in storage capacity, in 
‘super grids’ and ‘smart grids’. In the European Union infrastructure 
Germany alone needs an approximate 20 billion euros to adapt its system to 
the new realities of large RES shares and the nuclear phase-out, as 
described in its national-grid plan In addition, the actual connection of RES 
generation capacity is added to these challenges, especially in terms of cost, 
sparking debates about cost-allocation and the cost-creation principle. This 
is especially relevant for offshore wind parks.54 
Unconventional gas resources are thought to be, geographically, broadly 
distributed across all continents, including Europe. Their potential 
development may therefore offer a number of security-of-supply benefits 
for the Union: lower natural gas prices; more readily available gas on the 
European market; easing tightness in global energy markets; and adding 
diversity to the European Union's gas supplies. However, the growing 
focus on unconventional gas has not come without controversy. Notably, it 
has been argued that there may be several negative environmental and 
climatic aspects to its production. In addition, more and cheaper 
(unconventional) gas may challenge investment in coal, nuclear and 
renewables, as well as the established gas business model. And, of course, 
questions have been raised about the size of the recoverable resource 
base.55 
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Although it is not yet clear how many years will be needed for the first 
production, the recent discovery of natural gas resources in the eastern 
Mediterranean by Israel and Cyprus could open a new source of European 
natural gas. Such new energy sources are reflecting the increasing 
importance of gas in the European energy mix and the need, after the 
occupation of Crimea, to diversify imports apart from Russia. Since the 
European Union depends highly on pipelines from third countries, Cyprus, 
as a member state, could prove a valuable asset by serving as a conduit for 
gas flowing from Israel to the European Union. In this context, a bid to 
build an Eastern Mediterranean corridor would allow the European Union 
to achieve a greater degree of energy security. In 2012, the Commission 
gave its support to the Eastern Mediterranean corridor by including the 
Euro-Asia interconnector, the LNG storage facility and the offshore 
pipeline from Cyprus to Greece on the list of Projects of Common Interest 
(PCI) for the period 2014-202056. Cyprus and Israel countries European 
experience in developing their resources, both on a federal and state level. 
However, the Eastern Mediterranean corridor faces the problem of lack of 
investment and technical issues, all of which combine to block the 
construction of the needed infrastructure.57 
The fact that other countries in the region, including Lebanon and Turkey, 
may begin with exploration efforts should be understood by the European 
Union as a warning indicating that time is running faster in energy matters 
and that investments in crucial facilities must be realised fast and without 
bureaucracy. In this light it appears clearly that the European Union is in 
need of a coordinated action plan. On all the different levels of the existing 
threats the European Union's energy security can only be counterbalanced 
if all the member states cooperate. However, cooperation does not mean 
centralisation. 
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III.  The difficult attempt to reach a common energy 
security policy 
The current crisis with Russia is used to establish a common energy 
security policy in the EU. Therefore efforts to build an Energy Union are 
made by the EU institutions. Nevertheless, the divergence between the 
different national energy interests as well as the fact that the subject of 
energy security was for a long time left aside and played only a secondary 
role, do not facilitate the implementation of such an Energy Union. 
1.  The different national energy strategies as a reason for 
vulnerability  
The European Union member states do not all have the same level of 
energy dependency. The spectrum evolves from countries like Cyprus or 
Malta who are totally dependent on energy imports to Denmark who is the 
only European Union Member State to have a positive energy trade 
balance.58 This disparity is also visible in the energy consumption where 
Italy, Germany, France and the United Kingdom consume the majority of 
energy in the European Union 59. 
Taking into consideration the weakness of oil resources existing within the 
European Union, the member states are all highly dependent on oil imports. 
This common ground of dependency throughout the member states is 
however not true for the fields of coal, gas or uranium. These energy 
sources reveal a great disproportion of dependency between the member 
states. The status of the nuclear energy is also varying. In this matter 
France has for example a high amount of its energy coming from its atomic 
energy production. This has a direct effect on France’s dependence to fossil 
fuels. The same goes for Poland and coal. Indeed, Poland has the highest 
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domestic production of coal (lignite) which explains the little amount of 
dependency Poland has towards coal imports60. 
Concerning the topic of gas, the level of dependence is the most divergence 
between the member states. Having a closer look on the special situation of 
dependency towards Russian gas, it appears that this divergence is even 
higher. While gas imports from Russia are equal to 0% for countries like 
Denmark or Spain, they represent around 90% for member states like 
Slovakia or Czech Republic. There are even member states importing 
100% of their need in gas from Russia as for example Finland or the Baltic 
countries.61 These flagrant divergences explain also the main reason why it 
is very difficult for the member states to speak with one voice in energy 
security matters.  
2.  The record of the European Union's energy security policies so far  
This situation of having a multitude of different energy security strategies 
within the European Union evolved in this way because of the European 
Union's policy itself. As already mentioned, the aspect of security of energy 
supply was for a long time secondary. In the field of energy two other 
topics were traditionally of higher priority: The European Union 
concentrated its energy policy work on climate change and internal market 
integration. Policies about competition law in the energy market were held 
higher than the security of supply. Each of the two priorities (climate 
change and internal market integration) was deepened with policy 
packages. Security of supply was only mentioned, but no specific policy to 
this regard was created. 
In the field of climate change the European Union leaders committed to 
transform Europe into a highly energy-efficient, low carbon economy. The 
European Union has set itself a series of targets for reducing its greenhouse 
gas emissions progressively up to 2050 and is working successfully 
towards meeting them. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union 
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accepted to decrease its collective emissions to 8% below the 1990 level by 
the years 2008-2012. Most member states that have joined the European 
Union since 2004 also have Kyoto reduction targets of 6% or 8% (5% in 
Croatia's case) which they are also on course to achieve. For 2020, the 
European Union has committed to cutting its emissions to 20% below the 
1990 level. This commitment is one of the headline targets of the Europe 
2020 growth strategy and is being implemented through a package of 
binding legislation. The European Union has offered to increase its 
emissions reduction to 30% by 2020 if other major emitting countries in the 
developed and developing worlds commit to undertake their fair share of a 
global emissions reduction effort. In the climate and energy policy 
framework for 2030, the European Commission proposes that the European 
Union sets itself a target of reducing emissions to 40% below 1990 levels 
by 2030. For 2050, European Union leaders have endorsed the objective of 
reducing Europe's greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% compared to the 
1990 level as part of efforts of developed countries to reduce their 
emissions by a similar degree as a group. The European Commission has 
published a roadmap for building the low-carbon European economy that 
this will require.62  
All these climate policies had nevertheless also an effect on energy 
security. Internally the European Union policy in matters against climate 
change include long term effect which are positive for the energy security 
of supply, as it leads to reduce the dependency on fossil fuels. Externally 
the fight against climate change and the establishment of energy security 
are also closely linked. In the fossil fuel production countries, which enjoy 
large resources of fossil fuels will leave these resources untouched if the 
European Union members states are reduction the consumption of fossil 
fuel. The promotion by the European Union of the energy efficiency and 
the development of renewable energy will thereby not only decreased the 
greenhouse gases but also reduce the production of fossil fuels themselves. 
In the case of the internal market policies, the construction of the internal 
electricity and gas market was approached through the prism of the 
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competition law. This approach finds its reason in the presence of a legal 
vacuum. If the European Commission had effective legal means to act in 
the name of the European Union in competition matters63, in the field of 
energy the Commission was for long stripped of a legal basis. All this 
changed when the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union (TFEU) modified by the Treaty of 
Lisbon (TL) came into force and introduced the provisions of primary law 
concerning energy issues. The separate chapter on energy in the TL 64 
formed from this moment on the basis for establishing the secondary law 
and the European Union’s policy in this area. But even before this 
important change, the internal market policies were beneficial for the 
energy security in the EU. By inciting for example the transmission system 
operators to develop their infrastructures, these policies helped to increase 
the energy solidarity between the member states.  
Without losing sight of the aims to fight against climate change and to 
promote the competitiveness of the European economy, the European 
Commission placed the energy security at the forefront of it priorities by 
releasing in response to the political crisis in Ukraine an EU energy 
security strategy on 28 May 201465. 
A bit earlier in April 2014 the then Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk had 
expressed his idea of wider European energy cooperation66. According to 
him such an Energy Union would provide energy security and energy 
independence towards Russia. In detail Tusk, who has since moved on to 
become President of the European Council, suggested that the EU should 
buy its gas centrally and that the European Commission should overlook 
the different energy deals.67 This effort was picked up by the new European 
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Commission. Indeed, in his political guidelines the new European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker set the energy security as a top 
priority, stating that energy that underpins the EU economy should be 
resilient, reliable and secure.68 On the 25 February 2015 delivering what 
had been promised, the European Commission announced its strategy to 
achieve a resilient Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change 
policy69. The core elements of this strategy aim at reducing EU’s energy 
dependency. The European Commission mainly adopted the proposals 
made by Donald Tusk as beside the solidarity clause reducing the 
dependence on single suppliers, this proposed Energy Union includes the 
development a resilience and diversification package for gas supply and the 
ex ante involvement of the European Commission when EU member 
countries make deals to buy energy or gas from countries outside the EU.70 
This last point is very controversial as it touches upon the question of 
competence of the member States and the EU Commission in the area of 
energy. This controversy is especially visible in the latest Conclusion on 
the Energy Union of the European Council.71 In this response to the EU 
Commission, the member states mentioned multiple times “the right of 
member states to decide their own energy mix” and “the sovereignty and 
sovereign rights of member states to explore and develop their natural 
resource” as if they wanted to remind the European Commission under 
what kind of competence energy falls.72 
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3.  Energy – a shared competence between the member states 
and the EU 
Energy belongs to the realm of the shared competences between the Union 
and the member states73. Although the measures necessary to achieve the 
objectives of European Union’s energy policy – functioning of the energy 
market; security of energy supply; promotion of energy efficiency and the 
interconnection of energy networks – are set by the European Parliament 
and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, this does not affect a member state’s right to determine the 
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply74. Hence, the 
European Union’s energy policy remains an intergovernmental process. 
The European Commissions’ role in developing and pursuing the energy 
security policy is a derivative of the European Union's competences in the 
integration of the common market, transeuropean networks 75  and 
environment76. This seems true in theory, however the latest events in the 
Ukrainian crisis are now taken as a reason to put these rules upside down. 
Indeed, different voices throughout the European Union call for a single 
European energy policy, creating thereby a centralized structure leaving the 
European Union organs the only ones to be in charge77. While the idea of a 
new European Union treaty to embark on a common energy policy has 
already been advocated since 2010 by former European Commission 
President Jacques Delors and the then-European Parliament President Jerzy 
Buzek,78 in the light of today’s crisis different actors are trying to push for 
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this idea to be implemented. Despite the fact that these propositions go 
against the current legal basis, it is reasonable to say that such a policy is 
also highly unrealistic. As stated before, the member states are dependent 
in various forms and levels on energy imports. The energy needs of these 
members being heterogenic the possibility of a common energy policy does 
not seem feasible. As the general De Gaulle once stated, it is important to 
adapt one's policy to its geography (“Avoir la politique de sa 
géographie”)79. Behind this canon lies exactly the way the policies on 
energy should be taken. If in future the energy matters were to fall in the 
centralised hands of the European Union, the solution it would provide 
could not be as tailored to the different needs of the member states. This 
may be also the reason why energy was regulated to be a shared and not an 
exclusive competence. 
IV.  Conclusion 
The crisis with Russia has the virtue to remind us the decisive necessity to 
strengthen the European Union in energy security matters. Internally it is 
crucial for the European Union to reduce the risk of a supply disruption and 
increase the energy solidarity within the member states. Externally the 
European Union needs to find a way to diversify its supply and transit 
energy sources. This should be done not by claiming that all energy links 
with Russia are the personification of evil, but instead by using the various 
new possibilities of energy generation inside and outside of the European 
Union. It is important to understand that energy supply security hysteria 
will not lead anywhere if not followed by concrete investments in other 
sources. The European Union tries in to centralize decision making for 
energy matters forgetting that the energy landscape is different in every 
member state. Creating a common energy security policy through an 
Energy Union is thereby the wrong solution to take. The coordination of 
these policies – while leaving space for specificities at the same time – 
seems here a far more adequate unfolding. 
 
79  Rassemblement pour l’Organisation de l’Unité Européenne, website information. 
Online at: www.roue-europe.org/avoir-la-politique-de-sa-geographie-citation-du-
general-de-gaulle/. 
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